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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2000, security breaches have exposed over two hundred 
million sensitive personal data records.1
 
       †  J.D. Candidate 2010, William Mitchell College of Law; M.S., Information 
Networking, Carnegie Mellon University, 2004; B.S., Mathematics/Computer 
Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 1994.  The author gratefully acknowledges 
advice from Professor J. David Prince, the efforts of William Mitchell Law Review 
staff and editors who worked on this note, and the patience and support of his 
wife. 
  In 2006 alone, data 
1
Graves: Minnesota's PCI Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
4. GRAVES - ADC 4/28/2009  3:24 PM 
1116 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
handlers lost eighty-three million records.2  Lost data has become 
so common that a breach must now affect millions of records even 
to be newsworthy.3  One of the first widely publicized breaches, 
ChoicePoint’s 2005 disclosure of 163,000 consumer records,4 seems 
almost harmless compared to the breaches at TJX,5 Certegy,6 
Circuit City,7 and the Department of Veterans Affairs,8
Many states passed data breach notification laws in response to 
this problem.
 each of 
which lost millions of records. 
9  These laws require anyone handling personal data 
to notify people when their data might have been compromised.10  
As of 2008, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted data breach notification laws.11  These laws have increased 
the visibility of data breaches, but have not solved the underlying 
problem of poor data security.12
Minnesota recently attempted to fill part of this gap with a law 
forbidding companies from storing sensitive credit card 
 
 
 1. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 
2008). 
 2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: 
DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS 
LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 12 n.18 (2007) [hereinafter 
2007 GAO REPORT].  This is a conservative estimate.  It does not include the 
breach of CardSystems’ database, for example, which may have compromised up 
to forty million records although a CardSystems official claimed that only 263,000 
of those records included “sensitive personal information.”  Id. 
 3. Data handlers announced 346 data breach events in 2006—an average of 
almost one per day, with no more than six days between announcements.  See 
Attrition.org, Data Loss Database, http://attrition.org/dataloss/dldos.html (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2007).  At that rate, a newspaper would need a regular data breach 
column to report them all. 
 4. See Harry R. Weber, ChoicePoint Agrees to Settlement in Data Scandal, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at D2. 
 5. Larry Greenemeier, TJX Stored Customer Data, Violated Visa Payment Rules, 
INFO. WK., Jan. 29, 2007, available at http://www.informationweek.com/show 
Article.jhtml?articleID=197001447. 
 6. See Latest Data Breach Hits Certegy, Info Allegedly Used Only For Marketing, 
CREDIT UNION J., July 9, 2007, at 4. 
 7. See Will Wade, Security Watch, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2006, at 5. 
 8. See David Stout, Veterans Agency to Atone with Free Credit Monitoring, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A22. 
 9. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security 
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 915–16 (2007). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra note 23. 
 12. See discussion infra Part II. 
2
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authorization data.13  It adopted this requirement from a credit 
card industry standard called the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (PCI DSS).14  PCI DSS sets specific technical and 
business process requirements for securing credit card data.15  
Anyone who “store[s], process[es], or handl[es]” credit card data 
must comply with PCI DSS.16
Minnesota’s law, however, raises some troubling issues.  PCI 
DSS only addresses credit card data, and Minnesota adopted only 
one part of the standard.
 
17  Minnesota’s law provides remedies only 
to financial institutions, not consumers.18  Some have argued that 
the law is unnecessary because PCI DSS is already a requirement 
for anyone who handles, processes, or stores credit card data.19
 
     13.    See MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 (Supp. 2007).  Sensitive authorization data 
includes the data from a credit card’s magnetic stripe, the PIN verification code, 
and the credit card verification code (known as the CID, CVV2, or CVC2 code, 
depending upon the card brand).  See PCI SEC. STANDARD COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD 
INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY STANDARD GLOSSARY, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
(2007), http://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_glossary_v1-1.pdf 
[hereinafter PCI DSS GLOSSARY].  Anyone armed with this data can duplicate a 
card.  See VISA USA, CISP BULLETIN: TOP FIVE DATA SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
IDENTIFIED TO PROMOTE MERCHANT AWARENESS 1 (2006), http://usa.visa.com/ 
  
This note examines these issues, argues that Minnesota’s law does 
not do enough to help consumers, and that Minnesota should fill 
this gap by adopting a statutory duty of due care for data security. 
Part II of this note describes state data breach notification laws 
and explains why they do not adequately improve data security.  
Part III describes PCI DSS and then discusses Minnesota’s law and 
some of its features and problems.  Finally, Part IV argues for a 
statutory duty of due care and addresses some features such a law 
should have. 
merchants/risk_management/cisp_alerts.html (follow “CISP Bulletins” hyperlink 
in middle of page; then follow “Top Five Data Security Vulnerabilities Identified to 
Promote Merchant Awareness—August 29, 2006”). 
 14. See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA 
SECURITY STANDARD 1 (2006), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/index. 
htm (follow the link at “Click here to download the Specification”) [hereinafter 
PCI DSS]; Jaikumar Vijayan, Minnesota Gives PCI Rules a Legal Standing, 
COMPUTERWORLD, May 28, 2007, at 40. 
 15. See PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 1. 
 16. Id. at 2. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Nadia Oehlsen, Data Security is Fast Becoming a Matter of Law, CARDS & 
PAYMENTS, Oct. 1, 2007, at 32, available at 2007 WLNR 20225381. 
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II. THE FIRST STEP: DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 
A. History and Features 
Some of the first broad legislative efforts to improve data 
security came in the form of security breach notification laws.20  
California led the charge in 2002 by becoming the first state to pass 
a law requiring public disclosure of security incidents.21  Most states 
followed with similar laws of their own.22  As of January 2008, thirty-
nine states and the District of Columbia had enacted data breach 
notification laws.23
 
 20. Other laws affecting data security at the time only apply to certain 
industries.  For example, the Health Information Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) covers health care, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) applies 
to financial institutions.  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2007) (HIPAA applicability); 15 
U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2000) (GLBA). 
 21. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4501–04 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. §§ 1798.29, 
1798.82 (2007)). 
 22. 2005 was a banner year for breach notification laws, with at least thirty-five 
states considering such laws and twenty-two states enacting them.  National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2005 Breach of Information Legislation, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breach05.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 
2008). 
 
 23. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (Supp. 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
110-101 to -108 (Supp. 2007); CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (West Supp. 
2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (West Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 36a-701b (West Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12B-101 to -104 (2005); 
2007-3 D.C. Code Adv. Leg. Serv. 29–32 (LexisNexis); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681 
(West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-910 to -912 (Supp. 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 487N-1 to -4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-51-104 to -
107 (Supp. 2007); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/1–30 (West Supp. 2007); IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.9-1-1 to -5-1 (West Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 to -
7a04 (Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071–3077 (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 1346 to 1350-A (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-
3504 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); 2007 Mass. Legis. Serv. 540–48 (West); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72 (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1701 to -1705 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-801 to 
-807 (LexisNexis 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 603A.010–.920 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 to :21 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-163 (West Supp. 2007); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney Supp. 
2008) (applying to private organizations); N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 208 (McKinney 
Supp. 2008) (covering state agencies); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2007); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 51-30-01 to -07 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12, 1349.19-.192 
(West Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3113.1 (West Supp. 2008); 73 PA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2301–2329 (West Supp. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 11-49.2-1 to -7 
(Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 48.101-.203 (Vernon Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-101 to -301 
(Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
4
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Data breach notification laws require organizations to notify 
data subjects whose personal data the organization reasonably 
believes has been obtained by a third party.24  Notification must 
generally be given in writing25 reasonably quickly after the breach is 
discovered,26 and many data breach notification laws establish 
penalties for non-compliance.27
State data breach notification laws vary in their details, 




19.255.010 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-
12-502 (2007); S.B. 583, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
 24. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
 25. See, e.g., id. § 1798.82(g)(1); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 1(g)(1) 
(2006); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008).  Some states 
allow substitute notice based on cost.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.82(g)(3) 
(West Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(c)(3) (Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. § 
325E.61, subdiv. 1(g)(3) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435(b)(5)(B) (2006).  
Utah allows notification through electronic means, telephone, and newspaper 
publication without a threshold for cost or number of people affected.  See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(5)(a) (Supp. 2007).  Wisconsin’s statute allows notice by a 
means “reasonably calculated to provide actual notice,” but only if the breached 
entity cannot determine a data subject’s mailing address.  WIS. STAT. 
§ 895.507(3)(b) (West 2006). 
 26. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.82(a) (West Supp. 2008) (calling for 
notification to be “made in the most expedient time possible and without 
unreasonable delay”); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 1(a) (2006) (using the same 
language as the California statute).  A few states set specific time limits for 
notification.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(b) (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1349.19(B)(2) (West Supp. 2007); WIS. STAT. § 895.507(3)(a) (West 2006). 
 27. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-107 (Supp. 2007) (establishing a 
maximum $25,000 penalty for intentional failure to comply with notification 
requirements); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.9-4-1 to -2 (West. Supp. 2007) (creating up 
to a $150,000 civil penalty for “deceptive acts” under the statute); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 13-44-301(3) (Supp. 2007) (allowing civil fine of $2,500 per affected consumer, 
up to $100,000). 
 28. California’s law and others like it require notice to any person whose data 
“was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person” 
without regard to whether the breach is likely to cause harm to the data subject.  
CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.82(a) (West Supp. 2008).  See also MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, 
subdiv. 1(a) (2006); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2) (McKinney Supp. 2008).  
Some states allow data handlers to avoid disclosure if they believe the breach does 
not pose a risk of harm.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-102(a) (2005) 
(requiring disclosure only when, after a good-faith internal investigation, the data 
handler determines that misuse of the information is “reasonably likely”); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(10)(a) (West 2006) (permitting nondisclosure if, after 
consultation with relevant law enforcement, the organization determines that the 
breach “will not likely result in harm”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(a) (West Supp. 
2007) (exempting notification if the breached entity “establishes that misuse of 
the information is not reasonably possible.”). 
 the types of personal data 
5
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that trigger the laws,29 and the causes of action they allow.30  Critics 
cite this “patchwork” of state requirements as a major problem with 
data breach notification laws.31  Despite some arguments calling for 
a uniform national data breach notification standard,32 Congress 
has yet to pass such a law.33
B. Data Breach Laws’ Inadequacies 
 
Although data breach notification laws warn consumers that 
their data may be at risk from a breach, these laws do not solve the 
root problem of poor data security.  A solution requires more than 
mere notice of a breach; it requires laws that encourage careful 
handling of data and compensate victims.34
 
 29. Personal data usually includes, at a minimum: names, account numbers, 
driver’s license numbers, and social security numbers.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 
1798.82(e) (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 1(e) (2006). 
 30. Most states allow enforcement through state regulatory agencies or 
attorneys general.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-4-1(a) (West Supp. 2007); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(g) (Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 6 (2006); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-07 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(I) (West 
Supp. 2007).  A few states allow private causes of action. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 51:3075 (Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(10)(a) (West 
2007). 
 31. See, e.g., Eric Friedberg & Michael McGowan, Lost Backup Tapes, Stolen 
Laptops, and Other Tales of Data-Breach Woe, 79 N.Y. ST. B.J. 42, 42 (Feb. 2007) 
(referring to the “patchwork of state data breach notification statutes”); Sean C. 
Honeywill, Data Security and Data Breach Notification for Financial Institutions, 10 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 269, 271 (2006) (calling the twenty-one state data breach 
notification laws in 2005 a “patchwork regulatory environment”).  Because these 
laws typically apply to any person or organization that holds data about a person in 
that state, an interstate business must either monitor its compliance with a hodge-
podge of state data breach laws or choose to comply with the broadest provisions 
of all of them.  See, e.g., 1 Ian C. Ballon, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: TREATISE 
WITH FORMS § 4.09[1][A] (Supp. 2006) (noting that nationwide businesses need to 
consider which state laws apply to a particular breach and may choose to follow 
the broadest definition of “personal information” and use the most restrictive 
method of notification). 
 32. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Picanso, Note, Protecting Information Security Under a 
Uniform Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 389 (2006); Lilia 
Rode, Comment, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the 
Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1631–
33 (2007). 
 33. See Brendan St. Amant, The Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in Triggering 
Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 505, 510–14 (2007); John B. 
Kennedy & Anne E. Kennedy, What Went Wrong? What Went Right? Corporate 
Responses to Privacy and Security Breaches, 903 PLI/PAT 11, 26 (2007). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). 
  Data breach laws fall 
short of these goals. 
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1. Notification 
Data breach laws aim to notify consumers when their data 
might be at risk.35  The constant stream of breach announcements 
shows that, if nothing else, the laws do that much.36  Data breach 
notification laws force breached entities to warn people whose data 
may have been compromised, giving consumers the chance to 
protect themselves.37  Yet these announcements happen so 
frequently, they may have lost effectiveness.38  In one survey, almost 
forty percent of respondents said they mistook breach notification 
letters for junk mail.39
Data breach notification laws are warnings that only require 
disclosure after something bad has happened.  But warnings of any 
sort are ill-suited to fixing the data security problem because 




Several years before his appointment to the Supreme Court, 
Justice Breyer offered a three-pronged test for determining when 
disclosure is an effective means of regulation.
 
41  Disclosure works 
well only when the public (1) understands the information 
disclosed; (2) has a choice in the market; and (3) believes the 
information provided is relevant to that choice.42  The main 
problem with data breach notification is the second prong.  
Consumers inevitably have Social Security numbers, credit 
histories, bank accounts, and all the other bits of economic data 
flotsam.43  Breached data brokers, like ChoicePoint, never asked 
consumers if it could gather their data and consumers could do 
little to prevent it.44
 
 35. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 
  Breach notification also fails the third prong of 
Justice Breyer’s test.  After-the-fact notification of a breach does 
9, at 915–16. 
 36. See Attrition.org, supra note 3. 
 37. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 936–37. 
 38. Id. at 916 (discussing criticisms that data breach notification laws create 
too many warning letters). 
 39. Id. at 952 (citing PONEMON INST., NATIONAL SURVEY ON DATA SECURITY 
BREACH NOTIFICATION 2–4 (2005)). 
 40. See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of 
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1234–38 (2003). 
 41. STEVEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 164 (1982). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Solove, supra note 40, at 1251–55. 
 44. See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 362–66 (2006) (observing that data brokers do 
not allow data subjects to opt out of having their data collected and distributed). 
7
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nothing to help consumers choose to work with businesses who will 
be careful with their data.45
  2.   Behavior Modification 
 
A loftier goal for a data security law would be to make proper 
handling of data the financially prudent choice.  Laws change 
behavior when the expected cost of non-compliance exceeds the 
cost of the desired behavior.46  Most organizations choose to invest 
in security measures when doing so is, predictably and measurably, 
less expensive than not doing so.47
This model assumes rational actors with enough information 
to choose actions based on well-defined costs and benefits.
  A law seeking to encourage 
organizations to invest in security should therefore make the 
expected cost of a breach sufficiently large and predictable. 
48  Poor 
or incomplete information can lead to irrational choices.  Put more 
succinctly: “Garbage in, garbage out.”49
Most current information on the likelihood of security 




 45. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 
  Current 
9, at 947–48. 
 46. See David Bender, Privacy Developments—2005, 842 PLI/PAT 9, 19 (2005) 
(applying Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” effect to say that companies implement 
the level of security they deem necessary to avoid making a breach 
announcement). 
 47. See John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
545 (2003).  Businesses often follow this cost-benefit or return on investment 
approach when evaluating investments in security.  See, e.g., Huseyin Cavusoglu, 
Birendra Mishra & Srinivasan Raghunathan, A Model for Evaluating IT Security 
Investments, COMM. ACM, July 2004, at 87, 87–88; Judy Greenwald, Cost/Benefit 
Analysis, Access Crucial to Data Security, BUS. INS., May 23, 2005, at 18; Doug Lewis, 
Selling Security to the CFO, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 13, 2003, at 46. 
 48. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be 
Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 360–61 (2002); Gregory Mitchell, 
Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1913–29 (2002) (discussing criticisms 
of the rationality theory). 
 49. “Garbage in, garbage out” (or GIGO) is a phrase often used in computer 
science to capture the idea that a program cannot generate valid output from 
invalid data.  See 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ADDITIONS SERIES 114 (1993).  
Charles Babbage articulated the fundamental idea in the nineteenth century: “On 
two occasions I have been asked, ‘Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine 
wrong figures, will the right answers come out?’ . . .  I am not able rightly to 
apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.”  
Charles Babbage, PASSAGES FROM THE LIFE OF A PHILOSOPHER 67 (1864). 
 50. See, e.g., Greg Shipley, Desperately Seeking the Security ROI, NETWORK 
COMPUTING, May 27, 2002, at 35; KEVIN J. SOO HOO, HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?  A 
RISK-MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO COMPUTER SECURITY 29–46 (June 2000) 
8
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data security studies have serious methodological problems,51 
oversimplify,52 or do not claim to provide predictive data.53  
Without this data, the probability of a security event and its 
financial impact are unknown.54  An organization’s practices 
regarding uncertainty, therefore, dominate its approach to data 
security.55  Organizations that are risk-averse will over-spend on 
security,56 those that seek risk will under-spend on security, and the 
risk-neutral will fall in a random distribution somewhere in the 
middle.57
Organizational decisions also depend on the relative value of 
hard and soft dollars.  Hard dollars count directly and measurably 
against an organization’s budget, while soft dollars involve 
 
 
(Consortium for Research of Information Security and Policy Working Paper), 
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/11900/soohoo.pdf (discussing the 
lack of useful security data). 
 51. An oft-quoted survey in the computer security industry is the annual 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) Security Survey.  See COMPUTER SECURITY INST., 
2007 CSI COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY (2007), available at 
http://gocsi.com/forms/csi_survey.jhtml (registration required).  The CSI 
survey’s ten percent response rate and sample bias (self-selecting CSI members 
and conference attendees) cast doubt on its results.  See id. at 3.  The latest survey’s 
introduction acknowledges these limitations, calling the survey “informal.”  Id. at 
2.  However, the survey notes that “almost all financial information about 
[computer] crime losses are estimates.”  Id. at 3.  The survey is nonetheless 
popular with security vendors, who tend to use the survey’s bullet-point findings in 
their marketing materials while conveniently ignoring its self-confessed limitations.  
See, e.g., Ira Winkler, Time to End the FBI/CSI Study?, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 26, 
2006 (discussing the CSI study’s misuses and statistical problems). 
 52. One survey, for example, found that the average cost to organizations of a 
data breach was $197 per record.  See PGP CORP. & VONTU, INC., 2007 ANNUAL 
STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH 2 (2006), available at http://www.pgp.com/ 
downloads/research_reports/ponemon_reg_direct.html (registration required).  
If it were that simple, TJX’s breach of over forty-five million records would cost 
them $9 billion.  See Byron Acohido & Jon Swartz, TJX Discloses Largest Data Theft: 
45.7M Customers, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 2007, at 3B. 
 53. For example, Carnegie Mellon’s CERT publishes numbers of reported 
security incidents, but makes no claim that these incidents reflect the number of 
actual incidents.  See CERT, CERT Historical Statistics, http://www.cert.org/stats/ 
historical.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). 
 54. See SOO HOO, supra note 50, at 9. 
 55. Confirmation biases would lead organizations to make guesses or select 
data based on existing beliefs.  See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 48, at 361. 
 56. Being risk averse, these organizations may overspend on security—a 
problem that may not worry consumers but hampers economic efficiency. 
 57. See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 48, at 361 (discussing confirmation 
biases); Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 928 (noting that organizations can 
inaccurately calculate data security investment costs and benefits). 
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distributed, indirect, or immeasurable costs.58  Equipment 
purchases and labor expenses, for example, are both hard-dollar 
costs.59  Productivity savings are soft-dollar gains.60  Security 
investments almost always combine hard-dollar costs with soft-dollar 
savings.61  Many organizations favor hard-dollar savings over soft 
dollars, creating an internal exchange rate in which multiple soft 
dollars must be saved to justify spending a hard dollar.62
Notification laws have secondary effects that improve security 
somewhat.  Publicity resulting from a large data breach can affect 
public perception, profits, stock prices, and jobs.
  Data 
breach notification laws may increase potential (i.e., soft-dollar) 
losses, but they do not make those dollars any more concrete at the 
time security investment decisions are made. 
63
Data breach laws also increase costs to breaching organizations 
through the laws’ requirements for notifying the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) in the event of a breach.  The FTC can then file 
suit without meeting the same burden of harm and cause-in-fact 
that an individual would require,
  These 
secondary effects encourage careful data handling only to the 
extent that they are significant and predictable.  Unpredictable, 
poorly estimated, or trivial costs fail to improve security because 




 58. See, e.g., April L. Dmytrenko, Cost Benefit Analysis, RECORDS MGMT. Q., Jan. 
1997, at 16–17. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. For example, security improvements require devoting resources to 
hardware, software, or process development—hard dollar costs—in return for an 
unknown decrease in the risk of a possible future security vulnerability with 
unknown impact. 
 62. To many, soft dollars do not count as real dollars.  See Mark Ousnamer, 
Hide-and-Seek Cost Justification, IIE SOLUTIONS, Jan. 2002, at 22. 
 63. For example, after it suffered a security breach in 2005 affecting forty 
million credit and debit cardholders, CardSystems lost its contract with Visa to 
process credit cards and then declared bankruptcy in 2006.  Shanon D. Murray, 
CardSystems Files Liquidation Plan, DAILY DEAL, May 17, 2006, available at 2006 
WLNR 8444298.  The repercussions for executives and managers at AOL and 
Ohio University were more personal; they lost their jobs after data breach events.  
See Ann Bednarz & Denise Dubie, IT Execs Feel the Heat As Security Woes Multiply, 
NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 28, 2006, at 1. 
 and through civil actions and 
 64. Consumer suits require showing that the consumer was individually 
harmed as a result of the breach, but the FTC has a cause of action on behalf of all 
consumers over unfair acts or trade practices under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914.  See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 9, at 921–22. 
10
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consent decrees, it can levy fines and require improvements in 
security procedures.65  The FTC has exercised this right in a 
number of cases.66
3. Cost Shifting 
  Although FTC notification requirements raise 
the probable costs of a security incident, they do not improve those 
costs’ predictability. 
For most owners of large databases, the risk of poor data 
security is a negative externality.67  The data subject bears the 
primary risk of data loss but has no ability to protect her own data.68  
The database owner can protect the data but may not have 
economic incentives to do so.69  By shifting costs of a breach from 
consumers to database owners, laws can internalize those 
externalities.70  Current data breach laws do little or nothing to 
shift these costs.71  Their textual provisions rarely provide direct 
compensation to data subjects,72
Lawsuits following major data breaches show that courts are 
not willing to entertain causes of action for harm from a breach.  
The main problem is the difficulty of showing actual harm and 
cause-in-fact.
 and consumer efforts to recover in 
court have usually failed. 
73
 
 65. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m) (2000). 
 66. See, e.g., In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. 052-3148, 2006 WL 515749 
(F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2006); In re DSW, Inc., No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974 (F.T.C. 
Dec. 1, 2005); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 20, 2005). 
 67. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy 
Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2006). 
  Common law negligence and constitutional 
standing require plaintiffs to suffer genuine harm from the 
 68. See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 44, at 362–66. 
 69. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 70. See Goldberg, supra note 47, at 545. 
 71. It has, however, become "standard industry practice" for companies to 
offer free credit monitoring after a breach, even when applicable data breach 
notification laws do not require it.  2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 35. 
 72. See Ian C. Ballon, A Legal Analysis of State Security Breach Statutes, 903 PRAC. 
L. INST.:  PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES 135, 155–58 (June–July 2007) (discussing remedies for noncompliance in 
various state breach notification statutes). 
 73. See Denis T. Rice, Increased Civil Litigation Over Privacy and Security Breaches, 
902 PRAC. L. INST.:  PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 149, 173–77 (June–July 2007) (describing plaintiffs’ difficulties 
showing cause-in-fact and harm in data mishandling lawsuits). 
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defendant’s alleged conduct.74  A plaintiff in a data-breach case 
must prove that (1) her data was among that stolen in a data 
breach, (2) she experienced an actual identity theft or other 
hardship, and (3) the theft was a result of the data breach and not 
some other cause.  Because of the difficulties in proving these 
elements, courts hearing post-breach lawsuits rarely reach 
questions of due care.75
Cause-in-fact is difficult to prove in data breach cases.  People 
who steal mass amounts of data usually do not use the data 
themselves but sell it to others.
 
76  Police often cannot find the 
perpetrators of individual-level fraud.77  These factors can prevent 
identity fraud victims from tracing the misused data back to a data 
breach.78
 
 74. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing 
three elements for constitutional standing: injury-in-fact; a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and an injury that is likely to 
be redressed by a favorable decision); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 
(1965) (listing the elements for a negligence cause of action). 
 75. See Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709–13 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007) (stating that “courts have embraced the general rule that an alleged 
increase in risk of future injury is not an ‘actual or imminent’ injury,” therefore, 
plaintiffs do not have standing in such identity theft cases); Hendricks v. DSW 
Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (stating that 
the plaintiff did not claim any cognizable damages as a result of a data theft); Forbes 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. Minn. 2006) (citing 
the rule that the perceived risk of future harm—as opposed to a “reasonably 
certain future injury”—will not satisfy the damages requirement).  But see Guin v. 
Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at 
*3–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (finding  a duty of care under the Gramm-Leach 
Bliley Act, but one that did not extend to a duty to encrypt the contents of a 
laptop, which was later stolen); Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of Am. Fed’n of State, 
County, & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1023, No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, 
at *1–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (allowing negligence claims resulting from 
misuse of inadequately safeguarded personal information).  Note that Bell v. 
Michigan Council involved clear cause-in-fact and harm (fraud by the defendant’s 
treasurer’s daughter).  Id. 
 76. See Steve Lohr, Surging Losses, But Few Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at 
G1 (discussing recent breaches involving mass amounts of stolen data). 
 77. See Erin Dowe, Frustration Station: Attempting to Control Your Credit, 16 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 359, 362–63 (2006) (noting that identity fraud offenders 
remain uncaught “more often than not” and that the remoteness of fraud makes 
perpetrators hard to catch). 
 78. One successful investigation shows how far stolen data can travel before it 
is used.  In June, 2007, authorities arrested four people in Florida in connection 
with the TJX and Polo Ralph Lauren breaches.  See Larry Greenemeier, Arrests in 
TJX Case—Data Theft’s Long Tentacles, INFO.WK., July 16, 2007, at 20.  The data used 
by the Florida men to create counterfeit credit cards came from Cuban nationals 
in a fraud ring, who bought the numbers from criminals in Eastern Europe.  Id. 
  The law in this area, however, is still developing.  For 
12
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example, in Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, a plaintiff 
suffered $7,000 in actual damages from “unknown individuals” who 
opened accounts in his name.79  Because the plaintiff had shared 
his address and Social Security number with others, the district 
court held that he could not prove cause-in-fact.80  A Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding that the possible causal 
relationship between the breach and the identity theft allowed the 
case to survive summary judgment.81
The need to show actual damages has generated some novel 
theories of harm.  Plaintiffs have tried to claim damages for the 
costs of credit monitoring and other preventive measures.
 
82  Courts 
have rejected these claims, finding that the costs have been 
incurred in mere anticipation of possible future harm.83  Given the 
lack of other direct, measurable harms from data breaches,84 
plaintiffs continue to test the boundaries of damage theories.85
 
 79. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. Civ. 03-0185PHXSRB, 
2005 WL 2465906, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, No. 
05-16990, 2007 WL 4116068 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007). 
 80. Id. at *7. 
 81. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance, No. 05-16990, 2007 WL 
4116068, at *3–4 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007). 
 82. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709–13 (S.D. Ohio 2007); 
Bell v. Acxiom, Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 
3, 2006); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (W.D. 
Mich. 2006); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. 
Minn. 2006); Stollenwerk, 2005 WL 2465906, at *2–3. 
 83. See e.g., Kahle, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 709–13 (holding the cost of credit 
monitoring after a breach unrecoverable because it was incurred in anticipation of 
future injury); Hendricks, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 780 (rejecting cost of credit 
monitoring after a data breach as a theory for recovery); Guin v. Brazos Higher 
Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *6 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 7, 2006) (holding that the threat of future harm does not meet the damage 
requirement necessary to bring an action for negligence). 
 84. The biggest problem with a data breach is the risk that the compromised 
data will be misused.  Until misuse has happened, however, breach victims’ direct 
costs consist of time, effort, and money spent responding to the breach, 
purchasing credit monitoring services, freezing their credit records, or consulting 
experts on other options for protecting themselves.  See PONEMON INST., NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON DATA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION 17 (2006), http://www.whitecase. 
com/news/detail.aspx?news=670 (follow “click here” hyperlink near the end of 
the page). 
 
 85. These claims bear a remarkable similarity to the enhanced-risk and 
medical monitoring claims sometimes seen in toxic tort cases.  Enhanced risk is 
controversial even in that context, where the risk is of death or serious disease.  See 
Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposure 
Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 285, 328–29 (1994).  Courts seem 
unlikely to soon allow enhanced risk theories of harm for the relatively trivial 
13
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Banks have fared no better than consumers in their attempts 
to recover data breach costs.  Some of the most notable litigation in 
this area resulted from a data breach incident at BJ’s Wholesale 
Club in Pennsylvania.86  The facts of the case tell a typical story: 
poor security practices at BJ’s allowed third parties to access full 
magnetic stripe data for members’ credit cards.87  After some of 
these card numbers were used to rack up millions of dollars in 
fraudulent charges,88 Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union 
(PSECU) reissued over twenty thousand credit cards.89  It then sued 
BJ’s and BJ’s acquiring bank90 for the cost of reissuing the cards, 
claiming negligence and breach of contract as a third party 
beneficiary.91
The federal district court rejected all of PSECU’s claims.
 
92  It 
held that the economic loss doctrine barred PSECU’s tort claims.93  
It also dismissed PSECU’s claims for breach of contract, equitable 
indemnification, and unjust enrichment.94  In a later decision, the 
court also rejected the remaining third party beneficiary claim.95
 
financial harms that result from data breaches.  See also Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 638–39 
(comparing claims for credit monitoring to requirements for recovery in toxic tort 
risk cases). 
 86. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 
317, 322 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 
The failure of post-breach lawsuits illustrates how little the data 
breach notification laws do to compensate victims of data breach.  
Courts are reluctant to classify immediate post-breach costs as 
harms.  Even with more serious later harms that exploit breached 
data, the difficulty of showing cause-in-fact makes it nearly 
impossible for those harmed to recover from the organization 
whose mishandling of data predicated the problem. 
 87. Id.  See also discussion supra note 13. 
 88. See In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788 
(F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005). 
 89. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 322. 
 90. Id.  An “acquiring bank” processes credit card transactions for a 
merchant.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 91. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 322. 
 92. Id. at 327–31. 
 93. Id. at 326–30.  The economic loss doctrine prevents recovery in tort for 
economic damages unless there is damage to the plaintiff’s person or property.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998). 
 94. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 338. 
 95. Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:CV-04-1554, 
2006 WL 1724574, at *1, *13 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2006) (granting summary 
judgment for Fifth Third Bank on the third party beneficiary claims that remained 
after the court had granted a motion to dismiss on all other claims). 
14
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III. THE NEXT STEP: PCI-BASED LAWS 
In light of cases such as BJ’s Warehouse, and given continuing 
data breach announcements, existing data breach notification laws 
clearly were not enough to stop mishandling of personal data.  
Minnesota’s legislature saw a possible solution in the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard.  To explain why PCI DSS was 
perceived as a possible solution, this section first describes the 
payment card industry and the role of PCI DSS within it.  Such 
information provides the necessary background for the ensuing 
discussion of Minnesota’s law. 
A. Background: Payment Cards and PCI DSS 
The Visa and MasterCard payment brands are incorporated as 
associations of financial institutions.96  These institutions consist of 
“issuers” and “acquirers.”97  “Issuers” issue credit cards to 
consumers while “acquirers” process credit card transactions for 
merchants.98  When a customer makes a credit card purchase, the 
merchant’s acquirer clears the transaction with the customer’s 
issuer, who charges the purchase against the customer’s account.99
The relationships between banks, merchants, and the card 
associations rely on a web of contracts.  Contracts exist between 





 96. See Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments in the Credit Card 
Industry, 17 FDIC BANKING REV., No. 3, at 25 (2005), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005nov/article2.pdf (describing 
the corporate composition of the major credit card brands). 
 97. See, e.g., Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574 at *2 (discussing 
Visa’s relationship with the plaintiff and defendant financial institutions).  
American Express, Discover, and JCB use a different model: they issue credit cards 
and process merchant transactions themselves without the participation of other 
financial institutions.  See Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three 
Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 946–47 (2007). 
 98. See id. at *2 (discussing Visa’s relationship with the plaintiff and 
defendant financial institutions). 
 99. See Corporate.Visa.com, Understanding Payment Transactions, 
http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/fs/corporate/transactions.jsp (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2008). 
  The issuer and acquirer each hold contracts with the 
payment brand association through their membership 
 100. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *2–3. This 
description simplifies the relationships.  For example, payment processors may act 
as intermediaries between merchants and acquiring banks, but they are not 
relevant to the discussions in this note.  See Corporate.Visa.com, supra note 99. 
15
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agreements.101  The issuer in a transaction usually has no direct 
contractual relationship with the acquirer (except as a co-member 
of the card association) or with the merchant.102
Card association membership contracts require banks to 
comply with the association Operating Regulations and the PCI 
DSS.
 
103  PCI DSS is a set of technical and business process 
requirements for anyone who processes, handles, or stores credit 
card information.104  Visa, Mastercard, Discover, JCB, and American 
Express jointly developed PCI DSS and created the PCI Security 
Standards Council to manage the standard.105  The individual card 
brands enforce compliance.106  The credit card companies include 
PCI DSS in their contracts with acquiring banks; if a bank is found 
to violate the standard, the card company can levy fines against the 
offending acquirer.107  The acquiring bank usually passes this fine 
to the merchant whose poor security caused the violation.108
Unlike many industry and government security standards that 
speak in generalities and leave room for interpretation,
 
109 PCI DSS 
sets specific requirements.  It requires particular methods of 
encryption,110 prescribes network security technologies and 
configurations,111 and demands or forbids certain practices.112
 
 101. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *3 (describing 
Visa’s “Operating Regulations”). 
 102. For example, in the BJ’s Wholesale case, PSECU tried to argue that it was 
a third party beneficiary of the contract between BJ’s Wholesale and its acquirer, 
Fifth Third Bank because PSECU had no contract with either Fifth Third or BJ’s 
Wholesale.  See id. at *1 (explaining PSECU’s third-party beneficiary claim). 
 103. Id. at *9. 
 104. See PCI Security Standards Council, About the PCI DSS, available at 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). 
 105. PCI Security Standards Council, Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about/faqs.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Mike Petitti, Community Banks Benefit from Awareness of Payment Card 
Security, CMTY BANKER, Apr. 2007, at 32.  See, e.g., Press Release, Visa Inc., Visa USA 
Pledges $20 Million in Incentives to Protect Cardholder Data (Dec. 12, 2006), 
available at http://corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press667.jsp. 
  One 
 108. Petitti, supra note 107, at 32. 
 109. For example, the FTC’s rules under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 
call for “appropriate” safeguards against “reasonably foreseeable” risks.  16 C.F.R. § 
314.4 (2007).  Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) regulations allow covered entities to use any security measures that allow 
such entities “reasonably and appropriately” to implement the standards necessary 
for compliance.  45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2007). 
 110. PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5. 
 111. See id. at 3–4 (requiring network firewalls and specifying some ways in 
which these firewalls must be configured). 
16
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such requirement prohibits storing sensitive authentication data.113  
Under PCI DSS, anyone handling credit card data must never 
store—even if encrypted—a card’s full track data, card verification 
code, or PIN verification code after authorization has cleared.114
Despite low early compliance with PCI DSS, merchants appear 
to be making progress in satisfying its security requirements.
 
115  In 
July 2007, Visa announced that ninety-six percent of large 
merchants that accept Visa as payment no longer stored full track 
card data.116  That statistic only addresses one PCI DSS 
requirement; large merchants continue to struggle to comply with 
the rest of PCI DSS’s requirements.117
B. Minnesota’s Plastic Card Security Act 
 
1. Summary and History 
In May 2007, Minnesota enacted a data security law based on 
PCI DSS.118
 
 112. See id. at 12 (requiring annual network and application penetration tests); 
id. at 8 (prohibiting developer access to production databases). 
  The law implements, in a modified form, the 
 113. Id. at 5.  See also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 114. PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5. 
 115. See Evan Schuman, Have Retailers Given Up on PCI Compliance?, EWEEK, May 
10, 2007, available at http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Retail/Have-Retailers-Given-Up-
on-PCI-Compliance/. 
 116. Press Release, Visa Inc., Visa Marks Progress in Securing Merchant 
Systems (July 30, 2007), available at http://corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press 
719.jsp.  Large merchants are those that process over one million transactions per 
year.  Id. 
 117. See RSA, THE PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA SECURITY STANDARD IN 2007, at 
1 (2007), available at https://rsa-email.rsa.com/servlet/campaignrespondent.  
Small merchants are doing even worse, with only a nineteen percent compliance 
rate as of March 2007.  Id. 
 118. Act of May 21, 2007, No. 1758, ch. 108, § 1, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 
500–01 (West), 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 
325E.64 (Supp. 2008)).  Minnesota was not the first state to contemplate such a 
law.  A Texas bill would have adopted PCI DSS as law by reference so that any 
change to PCI DSS would be required under Texas law.  See H.B. 3222, sec. 1, § 
48.102(c), 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007), available at http://www.legis.state.tx. 
us/tlodocs/80r/billtext/html/HB03222E.htm.  That approach would have given 
private organizations the power to create public law, raising due process concerns.  
See id.  It also would have influenced contract negotiations involving the card 
brands because the PCI Standards Council could impose any condition it wanted 
as a matter of law by making it part of PCI DSS.  Fortunately, the Texas bill died in 
the Senate committee.  See Texas Legislature Online, 80(R) History for H.B. 3222, 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=80R&Bill=HB3222 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Vijayan, supra note 14. 
17
Graves: Minnesota's PCI Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
4. GRAVES - ADC 4/28/2009  3:24 PM 
1132 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
standard’s prohibition against storing full track data.119  Specifically, 
it mandates that no one conducting business in Minnesota may 
store a PIN verification code, card security code, or full track data 
after transaction authorization.120
The law creates a private cause of action for financial 
institutions to recover from entities that fail to meet the statute’s 
requirements.
 
121  It requires a breached entity to reimburse certain 
costs that a financial institution incurs related to the breach,122 
offset by any reimbursement the financial institution receives from 
a credit card company.123
Other states have proposed similar bills, but none had become 




 119. See MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 2 (Supp. 2007). 
 120. Id.  The law allows storage for forty-eight hours after authorization for PIN 
debit transactions.  Id.  Entities violate the statute even if service providers store 
the data for them.  Id. 
 121. Id. § 325E.64, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2008).  The cause of action covers 
breaches of security that occur on or after August 1, 2008.  Id. 
 122. Id.  Financial institutions can recover costs involved in canceling or 
reissuing cards, closing accounts and stopping payments, reopening accounts, 
refunding unauthorized transactions to cardholders, and notifying cardholders of 
the breach.  Id.  The law also allows financial institutions to recover costs of 
damages paid to cardholders.  Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., S.B. 1675, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007) (as amended 
Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName= 
&SessionId=51&GA=95&DocTypeId=SB&DocNum=1675&GAID=9&LegID=29808
&SpecSess=&Session=; Tex. H.B. 3222.  A similar California bill was vetoed.  See 
A.B. 779, 2007–08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/ 
  Time will tell whether Minnesota’s law 
spurs a flurry of other state laws the way California’s breach 
notification law did.  If it does, those states could learn from what 
Minnesota did right and wrong in its law. 
pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0751-0800/ab_779_bill_20070914_enrolled.pdf; Evan 
Schumann, Governor Kills California Data Protection Law, EWEEK, Oct. 15, 2007, 
available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2197107,00.asp.  California’s 
bill would have been broader than Minnesota’s.  In addition to prohibiting storage 
of sensitive authentication data, it would have restricted the handling of “payment-
related data,” defined as an “[a]ccount number, credit or debit card number, in 
combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would 
permit access to an individual’s financial account.”  A.B. 779 at § 6, sec. 
1798.82(e)(3).  Entities would not have been allowed to store payment-related 
data unless they had data retention and disposal policies.  Id. § 1, sec. 
1724.4(b)(1).  California’s bill would also have forbidden sending unencrypted 
payment-related data over open public networks, and would have required entities 
to limit access to payment-related data to people whose job functions require 
access.  Id. § 1, sec. 1724.4(b)(6)–(7). 
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2. General Features 
Legislating technology is hard.125  A statute must tread a fine 
line between generality and specificity.126  Make it too broad, and it 
risks interpretations contrary to the intent of the law.127  If it is too 
specific, tying itself to the technology of the time, it can become 
outdated or require legislative reconsideration when technology 
changes.128
Minnesota’s law covers a narrow set of circumstances; it allows 
recovery only by financial institutions, not consumers.
  By adopting part of a detailed technical standard and 
trying to generalize it, Minnesota gave its law both of these 
problems.  In most ways, it is far too narrow and specific, but it also 
has surprising areas of generality. 
129  It applies 
to payment cards, but not other sensitive personal data such as 
bank account numbers or Social Security numbers.130
 
 125. See, e.g., Matt Hines, Policy Experts Split on Spyware Laws, INFOWORLD, June 
28, 2007, available at http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/06/28/Policy-experts-
split-on-spyware-laws_2.html (discussing the difficulties in drafting anti-spyware 
legislation). 
 126. See, e.g., Allison W. Freedman, Note, The Electronic Signatures Act: Preempting 
State Law by Legislating Contradictory Technology Standards, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 807, 
813 (2001) (noting the contrasting technology-specific and technology-neutral 
approaches to digital signature laws). 
 127. See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS 
UNDER THE DMCA 1–3 (2006), available at http://www.eff.org/files/DMCA_ 
  It prohibits 
unintended_v4.pdf (discussing unintended consequences of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act); Hines, supra note 125 (noting pursuit of lawsuits 
lacking under the broad SafeWeb Act). 
 128. See, e.g., Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 
8357 (Feb. 20, 2003) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, & 164) (noting that 
“rapidly changing technology makes it impractical and inappropriate to name a 
specific [encryption] technology” in administrative regulations); Laura Hildner, 
Note, Defusing the Threat Of RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through Technology-
Specific Legislation at the State Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 167 (2006) 
(discussing criticisms of technology specific legislation as too slow to keep up with 
changing technology). 
 129. MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2007).  The legislative records 
show that the legislature explicitly considered, but then rejected, a cause of action 
for consumers.  The version reported out of the House Commerce and Labor 
Committee would have created a private right of action for “any person injured by 
a violation” of the bill’s requirements. H.F. 1758, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 
2007) (as reported by H. Commerce & Labor Comm., Mar. 20, 2007).  The Public 
Safety and Civil Justice committee removed the general cause of action and 
replaced it with language allowing recovery by financial institutions.  Minn. H.F. 
1758 (as reported by H. Public Safety & Civil Justice Comm., Mar. 27, 2007).  That 
language substantially survived to final passage.  See 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 
500–01 (West). 
 130. § 325E.64. 
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storage of full track credit card data, but sets no standards for data 
in transit.131
The statute also shows signs of a struggle to adopt a private 
contractual security standard as public law.  It attempts flexibility by 
using “access device” as a general term for payment cards,
  This narrowness is the law’s chief weakness. 
132 but 
loses some of that flexibility when it limits those access devices to 
cards133 and describes security codes as three or four-digit values.134  
But the statute also shows signs of unintentional breadth.  For 
example, its definition of a PIN and PIN verification code could 
include cardholder names and passwords.135




 131. Id. at subdiv. 2. 
 132. Id. at subdiv. 1(b).  The statute defines an access device as having a 
magnetic stripe, microchip, or “other means for storage of information” and says 
that access devices include “but [are] not limited to” credit and debit cards.  Id. 
 133. Id.  The word “card” may tie the law to a particular physical form of 
payment device.  See, e.g., THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 888 (2d ed. 1989) 
(defining a card as “[a] rectangular piece of stiffened plastic issued by banks and 
other institutions . . . .”).  The definition could include smart cards, which have 
microprocessors and allow sophisticated authentication methods. See generally 
Katherine M. Shelfer & J. Drew Procaccino, Smart Card Evolution, COMM. ACM, Jul. 
2002, at 83–88, but it would not include payment devices in forms other than 
cards.  A key fob, for example, is not a card, and a payment device based on one 
may not, by the strict language of the statute, be subject to section 325E.64. 
 134. Id. at subdiv. 1(d).  Florida’s definition of an access device in its criminal 
identity theft statute is much more precise: 
“Access device” means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic 
serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification 
number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument 
identifier, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in 
conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, 
or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of 
funds, other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(1)(a) (West Supp. 2003). 
 135. The statute defines a PIN as a code that identifies the cardholder, and a 
PIN verification code as any data used in combination with a PIN to verify the 
cardholder’s identity.  MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 1(h)–(i) (Supp. 2007).  
Those definitions might include, for example, usernames and passwords used in 
online transactions.  Nothing in the statute explicitly requires a PIN or PIN 
verification code to be a value stored on an access device.  See id. 
  The 
largest difference is that it only adopts a small subset of the 
 136. This difference is endemic to public laws based on private standards.  
When a legislative implementation differs from the standard that inspired it, 
organizations must comply with two similar but slightly different sets of 
requirements.  If the difference is great enough, the public law could conflict with 
the private standard it meant to mimic.  The problem can increase over time as 
the private standard is updated.  Referring to the private standard directly (i.e., a 
law requiring all merchants to comply with the requirements of PCI DSS) would 
solve this problem, but at the same time, create a worse one by making a private 
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standard’s requirements.137  Minnesota Statutes section 325E.64 
only adopts the element of the standard prohibiting storage of 
“sensitive authentication data.”138  PCI DSS is much broader than 
that one requirement, however, reflecting the wide range of 
business processes and controls necessary to ensure data security.139
Fortunately for merchants, Minnesota’s law differs from PCI 
DSS by being more permissive.
 
140  Unlike PCI DSS, it allows a forty-
eight hour window for storing debit card information after a 
transaction.141  It may also allow entities to avoid liability by 
encrypting full track data,142 a practice PCI DSS prohibits.143  Since 
Minnesota’s law is more permissive than PCI DSS, merchants who 
comply with PCI DSS will also be in compliance with Minnesota’s 
law.144  The reverse is not true.  Merchants who comply with the 
provisions of Minnesota’s law would not necessarily be in strict 
compliance with PCI DSS.145
3. Improvement on Data Breach Notification Laws 
 
Minnesota’s law fixes some of the problems that make data 
breach laws ineffective.  It allows cost-shifting for financial 
institutions and further increases the potential cost of a data 
 
contractual agreement public law.  See discussion supra note 118. 
 137. See § 325E.64, subdiv. 2. 
 138. Id.  See also PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5. 
 139. See PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 1 (listing PCI’s twelve requirement 
categories). 
 140. PCI DSS technically has room for permissiveness in that it allows 
compensating controls.  See id. at 16; PCI DSS GLOSSARY, supra note 13.  An 
organization storing full track credit card data might comply with PCI DSS 
through compensating controls, but it would still violate Minnesota’s law. 
 141. MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subdiv. 2 (Supp. 2007); PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 
5.  The Minnesota law applies only to debit card transactions, not credit card 
payments.  § 325E.64, subdiv. 2. 
 142. Section 325E.64 defines “breach of the security of the system” by 
reference to Minnesota’s security breach notification law, which defines it as the 
“unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information.”  MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subdiv. 
1(d) (2006) (emphasis added).  The breach notification law defines “personal 
information” as certain unencrypted data.  Id. at subdiv. 1(e) (emphasis added).  If a 
security breach requires unauthorized access to unencrypted data, encrypted data 
cannot be “breached” as that term is defined in Minnesota law.  Because liability 
depends on a breach of security, encrypting data might allow data handlers to 
avoid liability even though the retention requirement itself does not exempt 
encrypted data. 
 143. See PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5. 
 144. See generally § 325E.64; PCI DSS, supra note 14. 
 145. See § 325E.64; PCI DSS, supra note 14, at 5. 
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breach.146
Minnesota’s law allows financial institutions to recover the cost 
of reissuing credit cards when someone else suffers a breach of 
stored sensitive authentication data.
  However, the law does nothing to directly help 
consumers, and leaves an organization’s expected data-breach cost 
unpredictable. 
147  As such, the statute is a 
direct salvo at the BJ’s Wholesale result, and a look forward to the 
pending TJX litigation.148  Recall that in the BJ’s Wholesale case, 
Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union (PSECU) sued BJ’s 
credit card processor, Fifth Third Bank, after a security breach 
compromised full track credit card data stored in violation of Visa’s 
operating regulations.149  The court denied all of PSECU’s claims 
for relief.150  Had that case been litigated under Minnesota law after 
January 1, 2008, Minnesota Statutes section 325E.64 would have 
provided PSECU a viable cause of action.151
Some have argued that the law is unnecessary.
 
152  Card 
Association Operating Agreements already require anyone 
handling credit card data to meet PCI DSS requirements.153  
Everyone involved in a payment card transaction has a contract 
with someone else and could establish rules for liability and 
reimbursement by contract.154
 
 146. See supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3. 
 147. See § 325E.64, subdiv. 3. 
 148. See In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litigation, No. 07-10162-WGY, 2007 
WL 2982994, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 2007); Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. 
Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317, 321 (M.D. Pa. 2005).  Cf. Pa. State 
Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:CV-04-1554, 2006 WL 1724574, 
at *13 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2006). 
 149. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 321. 
 150. Id. at 338 (dismissing all claims other than the third party contract claim. 
Subsequently, the third party claim was also dismissed in 2006 WL 1724574, at 
*13). 
 151. See § 325E.64. 
  PSECU, for example, could have 
negotiated a contract with Visa that would have required Visa to 
 152. See Oehlsen, supra note 19. 
 153. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *3.  The PSECU case 
discusses Visa’s integration of its Cardholder Information Security Program (CISP) 
into its Operating Agreements.  Id.  CISP is a Visa-specific program that started in 
2001 and was incorporated into PCI DSS when the latter industry-wide standard 
arose in 2004.  See Visa USA, Cardholder Information Security Program, 
http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk_management/cisp_overview.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 154. See supra Part II.A for a description of the contractual relationships 
between consumers, issuers, merchants, and acquirers. 
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reimburse PSECU any costs PSECU incurred replacing cards.155  In 
fact, the Operating Regulations contain just this sort of provision.156  
In the BJ’s Wholesale case, Visa had “exercised its right under the 
Operating Regulations” to reallocate losses, forcing Fifth Third 
Bank to pay over $870,000 to issuing banks.157
Minnesota’s card security law is not completely unnecessary, as 
it does not merely duplicate rights issuers have under the 
Operating Regulations.  Visa has forbidden the storage of full track 
data since 1993,
 
158 yet fourteen years later full track storage is still a 
problem.159  Moreover, the Operating Regulations do not cover all 
the forms of loss that the Minnesota law does.160  For example, the 
Operating Regulations allow reallocation of losses for fraud, but 
not for “operational costs” such as replacing lost credit cards.161  
Visa also retains sole control over all disputes between member 
financial institutions under the Operating Regulations.162
 
 155. As unlikely as this seems given the relative power of the card associations 
compared with individual financial institutions, there may be some room for 
negotiation in the agreements. 
 156. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *5. 
 157. Id.  Visa also levied $555,000 in fines against Fifth Third Bank for 
violations of the Operating Regulations.  Id.  Those fines were not redistributed to 
issuers.  Id. 
 158. Id. at *7. 
 159. The BJ’s Wholesale and TJX breaches are just two examples of data 
breaches involving stored sensitive authentication data.  Visa reports that of 
merchants who handle more than one million transactions per year, ninety-six 
percent now claim not to store sensitive authentication data, but compliance 
among smaller organizations is lagging.  See Press Release, Visa Inc., Visa Marks 
Progress in Securing Merchant Systems (July 30, 2007), available at 
http://corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press719.jsp. 
 160. See MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 (Supp. 2007); Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 
2006 WL 1724574, at *4–5 (describing Visa’s Operating Regulations). 
 161. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 2006 WL 1724574, at *4–5. 
 162. Id. (describing dispute resolution procedures under Visa’s Operating 
Regulations).  The dispute resolution procedures do not claim to be exclusive—
members can still pursue legal options against other members outside the Visa 
system.  Id. at *6. 
 
Arguments that Minnesota’s law meddles with freely-made 
contracts have some merit, however.  Each issuer enters into the 
association membership voluntarily, with knowledge of the 
Operating Regulations and their dispute resolution procedures.  
The financial institutions that issue credit cards can ostensibly 
protect themselves through contracts; consumers cannot.  Yet the 
Minnesota law protects financial institutions, not consumers. 
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IV. THE FINISH LINE: A STATUTORY STANDARD OF DATA SECURITY 
DUE CARE 
Data breach notification laws do not do enough to encourage 
secure handling of data, and do nothing to compensate victims.  
Minnesota’s card security law creates a narrow remedy to financial 
institutions that have to reissue credit cards, but offers no help to 
consumers.  A better data security law is needed: one that would 
meet the behavior modification and compensation goals described 
in Part II.B.2. 
Several principles should guide such a law.  First, it should tilt 
the cost-benefit equation toward securing data.163  Second, it should 
compensate victims who suffer actual harm.164  Third, the law 
should be flexible enough to remain relevant as technology 
changes.165  Fourth, any related statutes of limitations or repose 
should allow recovery when breach-related fraud is discovered.166  
Finally, the law should ameliorate the difficulty of proving cause-in-
fact when a data breach has led to identity theft.167
A. Duty of Due Care 
 
The most appropriate solution would: (1) adopt a statutory 
duty of due care in handling data; (2) use a notice standard for the 
statute of limitations on identity theft-related tort claims; and (3) 
presume cause-in-fact when a consumer has both suffered new 
account fraud and been the subject of a data breach.  Each of these 
components is considered in turn. 
A due care standard would complement existing data 
notification laws and technology-focused laws such as Minnesota’s 
payment card law.  It would create a multi-tiered approach in which 
the duty of due care establishes a general requirement to take 
proper care of data, a data breach law requires notification of 
consumers when a breach has happened, and a few technology laws 
specifically define examples of per se negligent behavior.168
 
 163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (describing behavior 
modification as a goal of tort law). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 166. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
 167. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
  At least 
 168. That would fit products liability’s general approach, where the common 
law has long recognized a duty of due care while statutes specify requirements for 
warning labels or product features.  See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.2 (2007) (establishing 
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two states now have forms of statutory duty of due care for data 
protection.169
Economic efficiency analysis suggests that strict liability might 
be appropriate.  Negligence encourages due care by both the data 
handler and the victim.
 
Why due care?  Although negligence or strict liability might 
satisfy the desired principles, recovery through negligence better 
fits the nature of data security.  The reasons rely on theoretical 
interpretations of tort law. 
170  Strict liability is efficient when the victim 
has no ability to prevent a harm (e.g., data loss) through due care, 
because it gives the victim no incentive to take care to avoid the 
harm.171  Such is the case with data security.  Data subjects cannot 
improve the handling of their data, nor can they choose to have 
their data handled by more careful organizations.172
One such factor is the way each theory of liability changes 
behavior.  Negligence law encourages organizations to avoid 
accidents through carefulness, while strict liability creates 
incentives for organizations to avoid accidents by lowering their 
activity levels.
  This 
comparison would seem to give an edge to strict liability, but other 
factors favor negligence. 
173  Negligence is appropriate when greater care, not 
reduced activity, is the more efficient means of avoiding 
accidents.174  Strict liability has consequently been imposed on 
“abnormally dangerous” activities175 such as explosive blasting,176
 
food labeling requirements); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 7 
(1998) (discussing common-law food product liability); Henry H. Drummonds, 
The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employment, Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 989–90 (2000). 
 169. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
§ 48.102(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007).  Although both statutes set duties of due care, 
neither establishes a private cause of action. 
 170. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of 
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 873–74 (1981), reprinted in 2 LAW AND ECONOMICS 259, 
281–82 (Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997).  Much of this effect 
comes from the existence of contributory and comparative negligence, which each 
reduce the wrongdoer’s liability (either proportionally for comparative negligence 
or entirely for contributory negligence) according to the victim’s share of the fault 
for the accident.  Id. 
 171. Id. at 282. 
 
 172. See Solove, supra note 40, at 1234–38. 
 173. See Landes & Posner, supra note 170, at 283–324. 
 174. Id. at 285. 
 175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1979). 
 176. See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 513–14 (2d Cir. 
1931) (applying strict liability to blasting). 
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handling of hazardous wastes,177 and certain uses of poisons.178  
Whether an activity is “abnormally dangerous” rests in part on 
whether reasonable care can eliminate the risk involved in the 
activity.179  The proper liability regime for data breaches therefore 
depends on whether they are the “inevitable byproduct” of data 
collection,180 or whether they can be reduced by the application of 
due care.181
Products liability law offers a useful parallel.  Design defects 
fall under negligence law because due care in design can avoid that 
particular kind of flaw.
 
182  Manufacturing defects generate strict 
liability causes of action because those defects are seen as inherent 
and unavoidable when manufacturing products.183  Even careful 
manufacturers sometimes make defective products and society 
benefits by putting the cost of the harms caused by manufacturing 
defects on the manufacturer rather than the consumer.184
The history of publicly disclosed breaches shows plenty of 
room for improving due care in handling data.  Some of the more 
infamous data breaches happened to retailers who operated 
insecure wireless networks,
 
185 stored unencrypted card data,186 
failed to verify that certain customers actually were small businesses 
instead of data thieves,187
 
 177. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 313 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1986) (applying strict liability to chemical maker that buried toxic waste 
near a water source), rev’d on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 178. See, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133, 139 (La. 1971) 
(applying strict liability to storage of poisonous gas), superseded by statute, LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 2323 (1980), as recognized in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 
2d 1123 (La. 1988); Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (holding 
fumigator to a strict liability standard). 
 179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979). 
 180. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and 
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 264–65 (2007). 
 181. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of 
Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 276–78 (2005) (arguing in favor of a negligence-
based theory of data security liability). 
 182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. o (1998). 
 183. See id. § 2 cmt. a. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See, e.g., In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. 052-3148, 2006 WL 515749 
(F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2006); In re DSW, Inc., No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974 (F.T.C. 
Dec. 1, 2005); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788 
(F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005). 
 186. See In re DSW, Inc., No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974 (F.T.C. Dec. 1, 2005); 
In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 2395788 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 
2005). 
 or did not use “simple, low-cost, and 
 187. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Release of Consumers' Data Spurs ChoicePoint Inquiries, 
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readily available” methods of avoiding software application 
attacks.188  Other breaches involved un-patched software,189 weak 
user IDs and passwords,190 and postings of confidential data to the 
Internet.191
Of course, not all causes of data breach are so egregious.  In 
many cases, data was lost because of insider misbehavior,
  These data breaches were not inevitable side-effects of 
handling data; they were the direct results of preventable 
mishandling of data. 
192 lost or 
stolen laptops,193 disks lost in the mail,194 or lost backup tapes.195  In 
at least some of these cases, data was lost despite arguably careful 
handling,196
 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at C2. 
 188. In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. 052-3148, 2006 WL 515749 (F.T.C. 
Feb. 23, 2006). 
 189. See Press Release, Univ. of Colo., CU-Boulder Arts and Scis. Server Hacked 
on May 12 (May 22, 2007), available at http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/ 
2007/224.html. 
 190. See Heather Timmons, Security Breach at LexisNexis Now Appears Larger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at C7. 
 191. See Stewart Verney, Credit Union Paying for ID Theft Protection After Info Error, 
JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., June 1, 2007, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/ 
jacksonville/stories/2007/05/28/daily24.html. 
 192. See, e.g., Shirley Duglin Kennedy, I’ve Been Violated, INFO. TODAY, June 1, 
2006, at 17 (dishonest insider at the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicles); Paul 
Nowell, Banks Look At  Insiders in Security Lapse, FORT WAYNE J.-GAZETTE, July 11, 
2005, at 1C (reporting insider theft at Wachovia and Bank of America). 
 193. See, e.g., Melissa Allison, Missing Starbucks Laptops Had Data on 60,000 
People, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at A1 (containing a brief chronology of lost 
laptops with personal information, including those at Starbucks, Fidelity 
Investments, and Ameriprise); David Stout, Veterans Agency to Atone with Free Credit 
Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A22 (describing Veterans Affairs breach 
caused by lost laptop). 
 194. See, e.g., Andy Miller & Bill Hendrick, Georgians’ Personal Data Lost, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 11, 2007, at A1. 
 195. See, e.g., Will Wade, Security Watch, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2006, at 5 
(reporting 2.6 million Circuit City customer records inadvertently thrown into 
trash); Assoc. Press, 4 Providence Workers out over Data Theft, COLUMBIAN, Feb. 25, 
2006, at C5 (reporting theft of backup tapes from a van). 
 196. See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 
RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (holding that an 
employee whose company laptop was stolen from his home “lived in a relatively 
‘safe’ neighborhood and took” reasonable precautions against break-in, so theft of 
the laptop was not foreseeable). 
 or through unforeseeable acts of third parties.  
Perhaps some data breaches are unavoidable, but it is too soon to 
know because so many breaches are clearly avoidable.  Until due 
care is shown not to significantly reduce data disclosure, the law 
should err on the side of encouraging due care rather than 
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imposing strict liability. 
Finally, a negligence cause of action encourages data collectors 
to consider the effects its care of data has on others.  Instead of 
merely estimating the cost to themselves should a breach occur, 
data collectors would have to use the same formula a jury would 
use—Judge Learned Hand’s formula comparing the burden of 
mitigation with the probability and degree of loss.197  The loss 
portion of that calculation encompasses the loss to data subjects, 
not merely the data handler, and represents a vast improvement 
over data handlers’ current self-centered cost-benefit calculations 
when security is concerned.  Even if data handlers use different 
values than a jury would, or estimate different non-optimal 
values,198
B. Implementation Details 
Even with a statutory duty of security due care, a victim could 
not recover if the statute of limitations and repose had expired, or 
if they could not prove cause-in-fact harm.  Ensuring appropriate 
statutes of limitation and cause-in-fact standards could solve these 
issues. 
 at least they would be trying to estimate the right values. 
1. Statute of Limitations 
Some forms of post-breach harm can be hard to discover 
before the statute of limitations has expired.  A discovery standard 
would allow enough time to file suit without subjecting breached 
organizations to near-endless liability.199  Specifically, a statute 
establishing a duty of due care should allow actions within two years 
of when someone discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, 
that harm has occurred.200
 
 197. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 
 198. See Citron, supra note 180, at 263–64 (discussing the “uncertainty 
dilemma” of economic theories of negligence law). 
 199. The statute of limitations under a discovery standard begins to run when 
the plaintiff knows or should reasonably know of the existence of the cause of 
action.  Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 n.16 (Minn. 
1999) (citation omitted). 
 200. Even without a discovery standard, the statute should not begin to run 
until some post-breach harm has happened.  See Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 
Minn. 147, 153, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968) (“An action for negligence cannot be 
maintained, nor does the statute of limitations begin to run, until damage has 
resulted from the alleged negligence.”). 
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A discovery standard is needed because victims may not notice 
post-breach harms until several years after the breach.201  Some 
breached data never expires,202 and misuse often creates no 
noticeable signs.203  Many victims of identity theft find out about it 
only when they are denied credit204 or even arrested.205  Recent 
statistics show that nearly one-quarter of identity theft victims do 
not discover the fraud within two years, and almost one in ten does 
not find out until five years have passed.206  These factors suggest 
that Minnesota’s default six-year statute of limitations for tort 
claims207
A due care statute implementing a discovery standard must say 
so explicitly.  The Minnesota Supreme Court generally has not 
recognized a discovery standard where a statute did not expressly 
include it.
 may not be long enough unless a discovery standard is 
used.  A two-year post-discovery statute of limitations would 
recognize the need for a discovery standard, but reduce a data 
handler’s exposure to suit once that harm has been discovered. 
208
 
 201. See Solove, supra note 
  Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court’s 
40, at 1251–55 (detailing the undiscovered harm 
often caused by Social Security number identity theft). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See, e.g., Identity Theft: Restoring Your Good Name: Hearing before the S. 
Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, 107th Cong. 12 
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 Hearings], (statement of Howard Beales, Director, FTC 
Bureau of Consumer Protection) (testifying that five percent of identity theft 
victims were unaware of the theft five years after it happened, and that the average 
time to detect an identity theft was twelve months), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=171&wit_id=348. 
 204. See, e.g., Acton v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 
1096 (D. Ariz. 2003) (involving a plaintiff who discovered inaccurate credit 
information after a mortgage loan was denied). 
 205. Criminal record identity theft happens when a criminal uses stolen 
identity information to “evade legal sanctions and criminal records.” See 2002 
Hearings, supra note 203, at 13.  This form of fraud is especially pernicious because 
consumers have no easy way to discover that they have criminal records.  See U.S. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-363, IDENTITY THEFT: PREVALENCE AND COST 
APPEAR TO BE GROWING 61 (March 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d02363.pdf. 
 206. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT DATA: JANUARY 1–
DECEMBER 31, 2006 fig.8 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/micro 
sites/idtheft/downloads/clearinghouse_2006.pdf (summarizing 2006 statistics 
from the FTC’s Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse). 
 207. MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5) (2006). 
 208. See, e.g., Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 
(Minn. 1999) (rejecting the discovery rule for professional malpractice); Johnson 
v. Winthrop Labs., 291 Minn. 145, 150–51, 190 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1971) (rejecting 
the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases).  But see Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 
Minn. 37, 40–41, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (Minn. 1931) (applying the discovery rule in 
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decision in TRW Inc. v. Andrews casts doubt on whether the 
notification standard would apply in identity theft cases.209
2. Proving Cause-in-Fact 
  
Including the discovery standard in statutory language would avoid 
creating interpretive questions. 
The remaining problem is the difficulty of proving cause-in-
fact.210  Common-law negligence requires the plaintiff to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the 
plaintiff’s harm.211  The problem with data-related harms is that it is 
often difficult or impossible for a plaintiff to trace the original 
source of misused data.212
The law has dealt with similar problems by allowing rebuttable 
presumptions of cause-in-fact.
 
213  Presumed cause-in-fact reverses 
the burden of proof by requiring the defendant to disprove 
causation.214
 
cases of fraud). 
 209. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27–28 (2001) (rejecting the 
discovery standard in an identity theft claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act).  
A broad interpretation of TRW might suggest that the statute of limitations in all 
identity theft cases begins to run at the time of the harm, not discovery.  See id.  
Presumably, that standard would extend to third-party liability for harm. 
 210. This section assumes a plaintiff has suffered actual post-breach harm.  
Therefore, the problem at issue is not whether the plaintiff has actually been 
harmed, but whether she can prove cause-in-fact. 
 211. Schulz v. Feigal, 273 Minn. 470, 476, 142 N.W.2d 84, 89 (1966).  Although 
the standard does not require eliminating “every other possible hypothesis as to 
the cause of the injuries,” it demands more than “speculation or conjecture.”  Id. 
  Courts have used this standard when causation would 
 212. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 213. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a), construed in Flores v. Sec. of Health and 
Human Servs., 52 Fed. Cl. 294, 299 (2002) (discussing presumed causation under 
Vaccine Act); Zuchowicz v. U.S., 140 F.3d 381, 390–91 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(summarizing the opinions of Chief Judge Cardozo and Chief Justice Traynor as 
allowing a presumption of cause when an act increases the chances of a particular 
type of accident, and an accident of that sort actually happens); Erdmann v. 
Frazin, 158 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Wis. 1968) (noting a rebuttable presumption of 
causation when “one owing a duty to make a place or an employment safe fails to 
do it and that accident occurs which performance of the duty was designed to 
prevent”); Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation And Risk Contribution 
Model, 25 ENVTL. L. 549, 591–92 (1995) (noting that federal Superfund statutes do 
not require tracing cause to a particular defendant, in part because “the passage of 
years between the time of disposal and cleanup often results in unavailable 
relevant documents and knowledgeable witnesses.”). 
 214. See Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A 
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 249, 262–63 (2003) (discussing the 
so-called “reversal” cause-in-fact doctrine). 
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otherwise be difficult to prove,215 and statutes have adopted it for 
similar purposes.216
A data security due care statute should allow presumptive 
causation if the plaintiff proves two elements: (1) that the plaintiff’s 
information was compromised in a breach of data under the 
defendant’s care; and (2) that the information was both necessary 
and sufficient to enable the actual harm done.
 
217  The defendant 
could rebut the presumption by showing another likely source of 
the misused data.218
Such a presumption would mitigate the problems of showing 
cause-in-fact.  It recognizes cause when the plaintiff is prevented 
from connecting each of several dots needed to satisfy the 
common-law rule.
  It could also avoid the presumption by 
showing that the data was not actually compromised or that the 
data was not necessary or sufficient for the post-breach fraud. 
219
V. CONCLUSION 
Legislatures and courts are still struggling to find the right 
approach to data security law.  Ultimately, data security will not be 
improved through mere notification or through piecemeal 
legislation of individual technical requirements.  A statutory 
standard of due care for data security could do what these other 
laws cannot: take externalities into account, compensate victims for 
actual harm, and adapt to new technologies without frequent 
legislative revisits.  Most importantly, it could help prevent the next 
announcement of millions of lost personal data records. 
 
  When a customer has suffered actual fraud or 
other harm following a data breach and the information lost in the 
breach was enough to perpetrate that fraud, this rule improves the 
plaintiff’s ability to show cause-in-fact, but allows the defendant a 
reasonable chance to demonstrate that something other than the 
data breach caused the harm. 
 
 215. See Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 390–91; Erdmann, 158 N.W.2d at 283. 
 216. See Flores, 52 Fed. Cl. at 299; Boston, supra note 213, at 591–92. 
 217. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1788–
91 (1985) (discussing the “necessary element of a sufficient set” test of causality). 
 218. See Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 390–91. 
 219. See Wright, supra note 217, at 1788–89. 
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